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To Dollars from Sense: Qualitative to
Quantitative Translation in Jury
Damage Awardsjels_1233 120..147
Valerie P. Hans and Valerie F. Reyna*
This article offers a new multistage account of jury damage award decision making. Drawing
on psychological and economic research on judgment, decision making, and numeracy, the
model posits that jurors first make a categorical gist judgment that money damages are
warranted, and then make an ordinal gist judgment ranking the damages deserved as low,
medium, or high. They then construct numbers that fit the gist of the appropriate magni-
tude. The article employs data from jury decision-making research to explore the plausibility
of the model.
I. Introduction
This article proposes a new model of perhaps the most controversial aspect of the civil
jury’s decision making, its determination of compensatory and punitive damage awards.
As Edie Greene and Brian Bornstein write in Determining Damages: “Our understanding of
how people translate an individual’s misfortune into a monetary value is rudimentary
and elusive. . . . Understanding the psychological processes underlying these complex
decisions is of significant import.”1 The article builds on theory and research by psycholo-
gists, economists, and legal scholars to create a comprehensive account of jury damage
award decision making. A major goal of this model-building is to identify strengths
and limitations of lay citizen decision making about dollar awards. The article also
explores the implications of the model for reforms to the jury damage award decision
process.
*Address correspondence to Valerie P. Hans, Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School, Myron Taylor Hall,
Ithaca, NY 14853; email: vh42@cornell.edu. Reyna is Professor of Human Development and Psychology, Cornell
University. Both authors are Fellows of the Cornell University Institute for the Social Sciences, 2009–2012.
We thank the ISS Judgment, Decision Making and Social Behavior team members for their collegial and insightful
comments on our work during the fellowship period. We also thank Edie Greene and Jeffrey Rachlinski for their
thoughtful comments on a previous draft of this article, and Francoise Vermeylan for invaluable statistical advice.
1Edie Greene & Brian H. Bornstein, Determining Damages: The Psychology of Jury Awards 173 (2003).
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II. Background: Jury Damage Awards as a Lightening
Rod for Criticism
The jury as an institution is highly regarded by the public. However, Americans are more
enamored of the criminal jury than the civil jury.2 Many perceive civil jurors as overly
generous to plaintiffs, hostile to large businesses and corporations, and influenced by
biases and prejudices.3 Their awards are seen as erratic and unprincipled.4 Large jury
damage awards receive disproportionate coverage in the media.5 Lawyers and their
clients regularly express dismay over what they perceive as the rampant unpredictability
of jury awards, which makes it difficult for them to assess in advance whether to proceed
with a case or to settle to avoid a more damaging loss from a substantial jury verdict.6
Responding to interest group demands to impose limits on damage awards, state legis-
latures across the country have passed a variety of reforms over the last few decades,
including dollar limits or caps on noneconomic damage awards, total damage awards,
and punitive damage awards.7 New limitations have also emerged in the course of liti-
gation over punitive damages. In a number of decisions over the last two decades, the
U.S. Supreme Court has examined the constitutional dimensions of punitive damages;
many commentators believe that concern about irrational jury punitive damage awards
motivated the Court.8
In our view, these legislative and doctrinal changes have not usually been informed
by a clear and complete understanding of how juries decide on money damages. It is not
surprising, then, that some reforms have had unexpected effects. For instance, introducing
2Valerie P. Hans, Attitudes Toward the Civil Jury: A Crisis of Confidence? In Verdict: Assessing the Civil Jury System
248 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
3Id. at 257–61; see also Valerie P. Hans, Business on Trial: The Civil Jury and Corporate Responsibility 58–67 (2000).
4Hans, Business on Trial, supra note 3, at 58–67.
5Robert J. MacCoun, Media Reporting of Jury Verdicts: Is the Tail (of the Distribution) Wagging the Dog? 55 DePaul
L. Rev. 539 (2006).
6Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Juries, 60 DePaul L. Rev. 375 (2011); Jane Goodman-
Delahunty, Pär Anders Granhag, Maria Hartwig & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to
Predict Case Outcomes, 16 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 133 (2010); Jonas Jacobson, Jasmine Dobbs-Marsh, Varda
Liberman & Julia Minson, Predicting Civil Jury Verdicts: How Attorneys Use (and Misuse) a Second Opinion,
J. Empirical Legal Stud. (this issue).
7See Ronen Avraham, Database of State Tort Law Reforms (DSTLR 4th) (Sept. 2011) <http://ssrn.com/abstract;
902711>. Similar reform efforts undertaken at the federal level have been stymied thus far. See Michael P. Allen,
A Survey and Some Commentary on Federal “Tort Reform,” 39 Akron L. Rev. (2006); Robert S. Peck, In Defense
of Fundamental Principles: The Unconstitutionality of Tort Reform, 31 Seton Hall L. Rev. 672 (2000–2001); Effects
of Tort Reform: Evidence from the States (Congressional Budget Office, June 2004) <http://www.cbo.gov/
doc.cfm?index=5549&type=0&sequence=2>.
8Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). See also Catherine M. Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation
Marathon: A Window on Punitive Damages, 7 U. St. Thomas L.J. 25 (2009) (summarizing Exxon Valdez litigation).
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caps on damage awards has had the paradoxical effect of increasing average damage awards
in some jurisdictions.9
III. Research on Jury Damage Awards
Responding to the public and legal attention devoted to high-profile jury awards, legal
scholars, psychologists, and economists have taken up the subject of jury damage award
decision making. Some of that work indicates that jurors face great difficulty in fairly and
equitably deciding on money damages, whereas other research offers a more optimistic
picture.10
Jurors report being deeply challenged by the task of arriving at damage awards.11
Valerie Hans interviewed 269 civil jurors who had decided cases in which at least one
of the litigants was a corporation or a business. The juror interviews included a host
of questions about how the jury went about deciding on compensatory damages and, if
applicable, punitive damages. The interviews confirmed that jurors were often at sea as they
began to discuss what would constitute an appropriate award in the case. By their own
account, many jurors entered the jury deliberation room with no specific figure in mind.
Numbers emerged only during the course of deliberation, as they discussed the case
particulars and the plaintiff’s injuries with the other jurors.12 Even then, jurors reported
that it was challenging to come up with dollar amounts that corresponded to the injury. As
one juror, who decided a medical malpractice case in which the plaintiff had half of one
lung mistakenly removed, reflected on the process:
Out of anything I can say I hated, that was the part I hate the most. Because I just don’t think it
was fair that we had to put a dollar amount on this . . . we weren’t given a minimum . . . we weren’t
given a maximum. We were told to go into the room. Lock yourselves in there and don’t come out
until you have a dollar amount. And I thought that was very unfair, especially when we were just
regular everyday citizens. And we have no idea what is ordinary and customary in a case like
9Ronen Avraham & Álvaro Bustos, The Unexpected Effects of Caps on Noneconomic Damages, 30 Int’l Rev. L. &
Econ. 291 (2010); Catherine Sharkey, Crossing the Punitive-Compensatory Divide, in Civil Juries and Civil Justice:
Psychological and Legal Perspectives 79 (Brian H. Bornstein, Richard L. Wiener, Robert Schopp & Steven Willborn
eds., 2008).
10For summaries of the research on jury damage awards, see Greene & Bornstein, Determining Damages, supra note
1; Valerie P. Hans & Stephanie Albertson, Empirical Research and Civil Jury Reform, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1497
(2003); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Punitive Damages Decision Making: The Decisions of Citizens and Trial Court
Judges, 26 Law & Hum. Behav. 315 (2002). When it comes to experiencing difficulty in valuing injuries, juries have
company at the highest levels of government. See, for example, Binyamin Appelbaum, A Life’s Value? It May Depend
on the Agency, NY Times, Feb. 17, 2011, at A1, A3 (finding that the dollar value of a human life varies for different
government agencies).
11Hans, Business on Trial, supra note 3.
12Nicole L. Mott, Valerie P. Hans & Lindsay Simpson, What’s Half a Lung Worth? Civil Jurors’ Accounts of Their
Award Decision Making, 24 Law & Hum. Behav. 401 (2000).
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this . . . And I think if we could have had some type of guide, monetary guideline, as to okay this
is the minimum, this is the maximum, and then you decide. But I mean it was like, if we said he’s
awarded a dollar was this satisfactory? We didn’t know.13
A collaborative research group of economists, psychologists, and law professors
undertook one high-profile project that examined the process of punitive damage award
decision making by juries.14 The researchers began by noting that dollar awards are likely
to be highly variable because they are assessed on an unbounded scale. The minimum is
set at zero, but there is, at least theoretically, no maximum amount.15 This contrasts with
bounded scales, where both the minimum and maximum levels are established in
advance. The research group adopted a mock jury approach to examine how juries reach
punitive damages decisions. They concluded on the basis of their experimental research
that although mock jurors showed substantial consensus about the relative merits of the
different cases, their dollar awards varied dramatically.16 One cause of the variation, the
authors say, is that individuals translated their sense of outrage onto the unbounded
dollar scale differently, so that people with similar judgments about the wrongfulness
of the defendant’s behavior chose different dollar values. In their study, the group
decision-making process, rather than producing an average of individuals’ different
award preferences, resulted in more extreme awards in the direction of the group’s
majority.17
Outside the jury decision-making context, research on citizen competence with
numbers gives rise to concern about the ability of laypersons to decide damage awards
rationally. Work on the public’s mathematical proficiency, or numeracy, routinely finds
that people have trouble with numbers.18 An estimated 93 million Americans are not
proficient with numbers, and low numeracy (i.e., the inability to understand and use
13Mott et al., supra note 12, at 409.
14Cass R. Sunstein, Reid Hastie, John W. Payne, David A. Schkade & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Juries
Decide (2002).
15Id. at 41.
16Id. at 43–61 (describing study results).
17Id. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Ilana Ritov, Predictably Incoherent Judgments,
54 Stan. L. Rev. 1153 (2002); Neil Vidmar, Experimental Simulations and Tort Reform: Avoidance, Error and
Overreaching in Sunstein et al.’s Punitive Damages, 53 Emory L.J. 1359 (2004) (criticizing the research program on
methodological grounds); Richard L. Weiner, Point and Counterpoint: A Discussion of Jury Research in the Civil
Arena, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 703 (1999) (introducing a special section of the journal devoted to scholarly
assessments of the punitive damages research project as well as author responses).
18Valerie F. Reyna & Charles J. Brainerd, Numeracy, Ratio Bias, and Denominator Neglect in Judgments of Risk and
Probability, 18 Learning & Individual Differences 89 (2008) [hereinafter Reyna & Brainerd, Numeracy, Ratio Bias,
and Denominator Neglect]; Valerie F. Reyna & Charles J. Brainerd, The Importance of Mathematics in Health and
Human Judgment: Numeracy, Risk Communication, and Medical Decision Making, 17 Learning & Individual
Differences 147 (2007) [hereinafter Reyna & Brainerd, Importance of Mathematics].
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numbers) is even more prevalent among subgroups such as the poor and the old.19 People
tend to overestimate frequencies compared to probabilities. They pay little attention to
base rates, underestimate disjunctive and overestimate conjunctive probabilities, neglect
denominators in ratios, and make other errors.20
Economists and psychologists who study how people make financial decisions like-
wise find many domains in which people’s numerical judgments fall short of ideal.21 People
can go wrong in a multitude of ways when they think about money matters.22 People are
affected by phenomena such as mental accounting, loss aversion, endowment effects,
bigness bias, overconfidence, and anchoring. These and other psychological heuristics,
which can be useful shortcuts in many types of decision making, can lead to suboptimal
financial choices.23 Economists identify other troubles people have with numbers. To take
one example, “left digit bias” studies find that people pay much more attention to the left
as opposed to the right digits of multidigit numbers, and can be misled by pricing that takes
advantage of this tendency.24 Consumers underestimate the magnitude of precise prices
compared to round number prices of similar magnitude.25
In sum, basic work in psychology and economics indicates that members of the
public, and even experts, often flounder when they are required to make numerical
judgments. The problems can be even more acute when it comes to making judgments
19Valerie F. Reyna, Wendy L. Nelson, Paul K. Han & Nathan F. Dieckmann, How Numeracy Influences Risk
Comprehension and Medical Decision Making, 135 Psychol. Bull. 943 (2009) [hereinafter Reyna et al., How
Numeracy Influences Risk Comprehension].
20Id.; Reyna & Brainerd, Numeracy, Ratio Bias, and Denominator Neglect, supra note 18.
21Nicola Lacetera, Devin G. Pope & Justin R. Sydnor, Heuristic Thinking and Limited Attention in the Car Market
(Sept. 24, 2010) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1682191>.
22Gary Belsky & Thomas Gilovich, Why Smart People Make Big Money Mistakes . . . and How to Correct Them (2009)
(describing heuristics that lead to money mistakes). See also Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, How Much Do
People Know About Economics and Finance? Michigan Retirement Research Center, Institute for Social Research,
Univ. of Michigan, Policy Brief (2008) <http://www.dartmouth.edu~alusardi/Papers/Lusardi-Mitchell08.pdf>
(finding low levels of financial literacy); Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Planning and Financial Literacy:
How Do Women Fare? 98 Am. Econ. Rev.: Papers & Proc. 413 (2008) (finding that financial illiteracy is common
among women).
23Belsky & Gilovich, supra note 22.
24See Kaushik Basu, Consumer Cognition and Pricing in the Nines in Oligopolistic Markets, 15 J. Econ. & Mgmt.
Strategy 125 (2006) (discussing the common practice of pricing in the nines). Basu discusses potential explanations
for the prevalence of pricing in the nines based on consumer behavior, such as consumer irrationality (id. at 127),
association with discounted goods (id. at 126), and the greater availability and accessibility of round numbers (id. at
126). He concludes that consumers “do not do this reflexively or out of irrationality, but only when they expect the
time cost of acquiring full cognizance of the exact price to exceed the expected loss caused by the slightly erroneous
amounts that are likely to be purchased or the slightly higher price that may be paid by virtue of ignoring the
information concerning the last digits of prices.” Id. at 125. See also Manoj Thomas & Vicki Morwitz, Penny Wise and
Pound Foolish: The Left-Digit Effect in Price Cognition, 32 J. Consumer Res. 54 (2005).
25Manoj Thomas, Daniel H. Simon & Vrinda Kadiyali, The Price Precision Effect: Evidence from Laboratory and
Market Data, 29 Marketing Sci. 175 (2010) [hereinafter Thomas, Simon & Kadiyali, The Price Precision Effect].
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about money.26 The prevalence of low numeracy among members of the public implies that
some jurors may not have a clear sense of the magnitude of awards, especially very large
awards, and may find the multistep operations used to calculate them daunting. Some
damage award determinations are particularly difficult because they include mathematical
functions such as compounding, exponential growth, and calculation of present value,
phenomena that jurors find hard to understand and apply.27 The juror interviews and mock
jury experiments suggest that civil jurors find it challenging when they embark, with little
guidance, on the task of deciding on money damages for injured plaintiffs. The unbounded
scale for dollar damages exacerbates the challenge. All this paints a gloomy picture of the
ability of juries to arrive at reasonable damage award decisions.
In contrast to this bleak conclusion, statistical and other analyses of actual jury
damage awards offer a more reassuring assessment.28 Analyses of civil cases and damage
awards routinely find that more serious injuries, measured in a number of different ways,
typically produce greater jury damage awards that reflect their relative severity. For
example, studies of the closed claims of insurance companies have shown that the magni-
tude of awards is positively associated with the severity of the injury, such that more serious
injuries result in larger awards. Analysis of the actual punitive damage awards reached by
juries (and judges) shows that they are awarded infrequently, and occur primarily in
intentional tort and fraud cases. On average, punitive damages awards tend to be modest
and proportionate to compensatory damages.29
Other research using mock scenarios finds that when laypersons, judges, and lawyers
review the same case descriptions, the different groups overlap substantially in how they
rate injury severity and assess appropriate damage amounts.30 As Eisenberg and his col-
leagues report, despite the fact that there is “convincing empirical evidence that people lack
the basic cognitive skills necessary to translate qualitative moral judgments into quantitative
numerical scales. . . . the research on quantitative judgments demonstrates substantial con-
sistency in judgments. . . . In civil lawsuits, the worst-behaved defendants who caused the
most harm are the most likely to lose and pay the most damages.”31
26Reyna & Brainerd, The Importance of Mathematics, supra note 18.
27Jane Goodman, Edie Greene & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Runaway Verdicts or Reasoned Determinations: Mock Juror
Strategies in Awarding Damages, 29 Jurimetrics J. 285 (1989).
28See Neil Vidmar & Valerie P. Hans, American Juries 267–338 (2007). See also Theodore Eisenberg, Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Martin T. Wells, Reconciling Experimental Incoherence with Real-World Coherence in Punitive Awards,
54 Stan. L. Rev. 1239, 1241 (2001–2002) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Real-World Coherence].
29Theodore Eisenberg, Valerie P. Hans & Martin T. Wells, The Relation Between Punitive and Compensatory Awards:
Combining Extreme Data with the Mass of Awards, in Civil Juries and Civil Justice: Psychological and Legal Perspec-
tives 105 (Brian H. Bornstein, Richard L. Wiener, Robert Schopp & Steven Willborn eds., 2008).
30Roselle L. Wissler, Allen J. Hart & Michael J. Saks, Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison of
Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 751 (1999).
31Eisenberg et al., Real-World Coherence, supra note 28, at 1240, 1241.
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Yet even the statistical analyses show that there is a good deal of variability and
unpredictability in both compensatory and punitive damage awards. The models compar-
ing jurors, judges, and lawyers were better able to account for injury severity ratings than
they were for dollar award recommendations.32 Michael Saks and his colleagues report that
even though more serious injuries produce higher dollar awards, there remains substantial
variation across individuals in the dollar amounts they give to injuries of similar severity.33
IV. A Theoretical Model of Juror Damage Award
Decision Making
We combine theoretical ideas and research findings from psychologists, economists, and
legal scholars, and use them to construct a model of juror damage award decision making.
The endeavor will, we hope, be useful theoretically and also practically. Our aim is to
better understand the process by which jurors move from the qualitative to the quantitative,
from sense to dollars. It may also point us in the direction of potential reforms to improve
the jury system.
We propose a model that draws to a significant degree on the work done on human
information processing and judgment and decision making in general, and fuzzy-trace
theory in particular. Fuzzy-trace theory is a theory of memory and cognition that draws on
what researchers have learned about judgment and decision processes. Numerous experi-
ments have tested and confirmed the central claims of fuzzy-trace theory in other decision-
making domains.34 Here, for the first time, we apply its insights to damage award decision
making.
A key assumption of fuzzy-trace theory is that people encode two parallel types of
mental representations (or memory traces) of information. One is a verbatim representa-
tion, and the other is a gist representation. Verbatim representations are literal, veridical,
and detailed. In contrast, gist representations are centered around the meaning that a
person derives from the information.35 Verbatim representations preserve the exact surface
form of information, such as exact wording and precise numbers, compared to the bottom-
32Wissler et al., supra note 30.
33Michael J. Saks, Lisa A. Hollinger, Roselle L. Wissler, David Lee Evans & Allen J. Hart, Reducing Variability in Civil
Jury Awards, 21 Law & Hum. Behav. 243 (1997).
34Valerie F. Reyna & Charles J. Brainerd, Fuzzy-Trace Theory: An Interim Synthesis, 7 Learning & Individual
Differences 1 (1995) [hereinafter Reyna & Brainerd, Interim Synthesis].
35Gist representations are said to be “fuzzy,” reflecting the fact that they are not as precise as verbatim representations.
Mental representations of information vary along a verbatim-to-gist continuum. Verbatim memory traces preserve
veridical details at the precise end of the continuum, whereas gist representations preserve the meanings that have
been extracted at the fuzzy end. Valerie F. Reyna & Wanda Casillas, Development and Dual Processes in Moral
Reasoning: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory Approach, in 50 Moral Judgment and Decision Making: The Psychology of
Learning and Motivation 207, 208 (D.M. Bartels et al. eds., 2009) (describing fuzzy-trace theory and its application
to moral reasoning).
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line meaning captured in gist representations. Research has shown that people extract
multiple gist representations of the same information, and that verbatim and gist repre-
sentations are encoded, retrieved, and stored separately and independently.36 Reyna and
Brainerd have generalized the concepts of gist and verbatim representations beyond verbal
information to encompass numbers, graphs, pictures, and other meaningful stimuli.37
Gist and verbatim mental representations are associated with different kinds of
thinking, and people engage in both forms of thinking at different times. When they make
judgments, however, gist tends to be more significant, more important, and more domi-
nant.38 So, for example, when presented with a probability describing the likelihood of a
future event, an individual may encode the exact probability given, but the underlying
meaning of the probability (e.g., coded for gist as low or high risk) is more likely to govern
their risk-related behavior.
Gist usually trumps verbatim representations in judgment and decision making, and
is used as a default whenever the task allows. However, specific task demands, such as asking
for exact numerical judgments, require mental representations that are more precise, and
may push people toward the verbatim end of the continuum. Thus, the extent to which
verbatim versus gist approaches will emerge as dominant depends in part on the demands
of the task, as well as on other features and cues in the context. Task demands force people
to make finer distinctions, moving from categorical or all-or-none distinctions (e.g., some
money vs. nothing) to ordinal ones (e.g., low vs. high amounts of money) and, if necessary,
to numerical estimates (e.g., exact dollar estimates). However, people prefer to operate on
fuzzier categorical or ordinal representations of quantity, and have difficulty assigning exact
numerical values, especially to unfamiliar entities. For example, classic work on contingent
valuation has demonstrated wide swings in estimated willingness to pay to save an endan-
gered species from extinction or to avoid living next to a nuclear power plant.39 Fuzzy-trace
theory explains this variability in numerical estimates by assuming that values are not fully
spelled out in long-term memory and are instantiated depending on the context. People
are likely to know whether they highly value saving an endangered species, but they must
construct an exact dollar amount to attach to that ordinal judgment of value.
Moreover, according to fuzzy-trace theory, numbers do not have meanings in them-
selves, even to the highly numerate. The gist or meaning of a number depends on both
content and context; it is inherently relative. To illustrate the effect of content, note that a
probability of 0.15 of imminent rain is low whereas the same 0.15 probability of an
imminent heart attack is high. The effect of context has been demonstrated by showing, for
36Reyna & Brainerd, Interim Synthesis, supra note 34.
37Id.
38The dominance of gist thinking is referred to as a “fuzzy processing preference.” Valerie F. Reyna, A Theory of
Medical Decision Making and Health: Fuzzy-Trace Theory, 28 Med. Decision Making 850 (2008).
39For a discussion of contingent valuation and other phenomena in legal contexts, see Peter H. Huang, Moody
Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Materiality of Information and the Reasonableness of Investors,
13 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. 99 (2005).
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example, that a risk of 12 percent is perceived as low relative to 20 percent, but the same 12
percent is perceived as high relative to 4 percent.40
Numbers that differentiate categories are interpretable because the differences they
span are qualitative rather than quantitative. Thus, a difference between a 1 percent chance
of cancer and a 0 percent chance is meaningful in an all-or-none fashion, as are differences
such as above and below 50 percent or between 95 percent and 100 percent. One would pay
a great deal to reduce cancer risk from 1 percent to 0 percent because these differ
categorically. When numbers cross category boundaries, as in these examples, when the
number reveals that an event becomes possible rather than impossible, or becomes certain
rather than uncertain, those differences are interpretable because their qualitative gist is
apparent. Specific numbers can also take on meaning because of content (e.g., a year’s
earnings of a company) or context (e.g., lifetime earnings of an individual from a poor vs.
an affluent community).
An important aspect of fuzzy-trace theory, which stands in contrast to many other
dual-process theories, is that gist judgments are not presumed to constitute an intellectually
inferior and more primitive form of thinking. Dual-process theories generally contrast
“Type 1” or faster and intuitive thinking and “Type 2” or rational and deliberative thinking.
Often, the rational, deliberative form of thinking is considered to be superior.41 However,
in many ways gist thinking is quite sophisticated. Adults are more likely to engage in gist
thinking compared to children; and in expertise-relevant domains, experts have been
found to engage in gist thinking more than nonexperts.42 Interestingly, one study found
that expert cardiologists employed fewer dimensions of information to make admissions
decisions for patients with chest pain, compared to generalists or students, but were
nonetheless more accurate according to clinical guidelines.43
Standard dual-process theorists have argued that better numeracy should improve
decision making, which is in stark contrast to fuzzy-trace theorists, who maintain the
distinction between rote computation (how numeracy is typically measured) and meaning-
ful interpretation of numbers. Fuzzy-trace theorists envision that some highly numerate
people fit the old maxim, “knowing the price of everything and the value of nothing.” One
might interpret this as a dual-process distinction between objectivity (price) and sentiment
(value). However, when ordinary people use the expression about the price of everything
40For the content example, see Valerie F. Reyna & Farrell J. Lloyd, Physician Decision-Making and Cardiac Risk:
Effects of Knowledge, Risk Perception, Risk Tolerance, and Fuzzy Processing, 12 J. Experimental Psychol.: Applied
179 (2006). For the context example, see P.D. Windschitl, R. Martin & A.R. Flugstad, Context and the Interpretation
of Likelihood Information: The Role of Intergroup Comparisons on Perceived Vulnerability. 82 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 742 (2002).
41Jonathan St. B.T. Evans, Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition, 59 Ann. Rev.
Psychol. 255 (2008). See also Gideon Keren & Yaacov Schul, Two is Not Always Better Than One: A Critical Evaluation
of Two-System Theories, 4 Persp. Psychol. Sci. 533–50 (2009).
42Reyna & Lloyd, supra note 40.
43Id.
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yet the value of nothing, we believe they mean to suggest that a person fixated on verbatim
prices has missed the deeper point. Indeed, research has generated paradoxical findings
that people higher in numeracy are more likely to rate numerically inferiormonetary gambles
as more attractive than superior gambles (ones offering a lower potential for losses).44
These and other insights have shaped the development of our multistage account.
Figure 1 displays our model of juror damage award decision making. At the start of
the trial and throughout the course of the trial, we expect jurors to engage in mainly
gist-based reasoning about the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s culpability. The case
facts, the character of the parties, the context and nature of the case, individual attitudes,
views, and world knowledge all combine to lead a juror to arrive at a more or less coherent
interpretation of events, or gist representation of the case, which would typically support a
decision about whether the defendant is liable for the plaintiff’s injury. That is accom-
plished at the first stage. We expect that jurors essentially follow the first step of Pennington
and Hastie’s story model, organizing the evidence around causal interpretation to arrive at
a liability determination.
In the second stage, which occurs during the trial or deliberation, the juror will also
reach a categorical conclusion about whether damages are warranted. This categorical
judgment (yes or no on damages) is followed by a third stage in which jurors make ordinal
judgments relating to the injury’s severity. We theorize that jurors code the specific injury
the plaintiff has suffered as either severe or not severe, and consequently they determine
whether the damage award that is deserved is low or high. Again, this prediction is based on
research showing that once phenomena such as injuries are categorized, intuitions about
44Reyna et al., How Numeracy Influences Risk Comprehension, supra note 19.
Figure 1: A model of jury damage award decision making.
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ordinal distinctions between low and high (but not specific numbers) are accessible in
memory.
According to the theory, categorical and ordinal gist judgments are not based on
adding up a list of facts, but on the interpretation of those facts, often as a coherent
narrative, which supports a simple bottom-line intuition of yes or no to damages and, if yes,
as low or high. If an injury cannot be ranked as either low or high, it will be relegated to a
medium level of severity. In the final stage, the ordinal gist judgment about the injury’s
severity (low, medium, or high) will be mapped onto a number that corresponds to the gist
of the award judgment. The juror will identify a number that is, to him or her, low, medium,
or high, in order to match the perceived severity of injury.
Where do these numbers come from? We propose that jurors rely on symbolic
numbers from everyday life that already have meaning to them as low or high numbers.
One dollar is low; a million dollars is high, for example. In addition, the juror retrieves
numbers from the case, such as medical costs, lost wages, and attorney ad damnum
requests, numbers that the attorneys have convincingly portrayed as having a meaningful
interpretation in the context of the case. The juror then selects a number that matches the
ordinal (low, medium, high) gist of the injury.45
In sum, Figure 1 posits that jurors move through categorical (damages are war-
ranted) and ordinal (the damages that are deserved are low, medium, or high) stages that
are distinct from the process of attaching numbers that accord with this ordinal gist. We
argue that jurors use qualitative meaning or the gist of the case to assess whether there is a
fit with the gist of the proposed award. They then construct numbers that exemplify that gist
of low versus high awards.
One might assume that a gist-based account is a better fit for the calculation of
damages like pain and suffering or punitive damages, as opposed to economic damages that
are assumed to be more well-defined and more closely linked to medical expenses, lost
wages, property damage, and the like. However, both sorts of damages must be interpreted,
even if there are precise dollar values attached to the economic damages. Thus, we antici-
pate that the model will help explain the full spectrum of damage award decisions.
The model does not yet include a full consideration of the group nature of jury
damage awards, which we recognize as very important. However, the model has some
implications for interactions among jurors with different ordinal gist interpretations of the
case. First, juries consisting of members who view the gist as low and members who view the
gist as high will center debate on the ordinal gist of the case. In contrast, juries of all low or
all high gist members are more likely to debate the numbers, the size of the damage award
45Interestingly, David Ball, David Ball on Damages 3d ed. 238–42 (2011), proposes that attorneys employ a “scales”
approach to help jurors map the severity of the injury onto dollar values. “The method you will now teach in closing
helps jurors arrive at a figure; it also arms your favorable jurors with a concrete way to fight for the amount they want
to allow.” Id. at 238. He recommends that attorneys explain that the value of each noneconomic harm is based on how
bad the injury is, how long the plaintiff is likely to experience pain, and how much it prevents the plaintiff from
engaging in regular activities. “Where on the scale of disability does each harm lie? A disability can interfere with
functioning anywhere from hardly at all up through total incapacity. . . . let’s go up the scale another step to
‘high’. . . . In a case like that, I would have to ask you for a verdict of a great deal of money, in the same proportion
as the pain.” Id. at. 239.
130 Hans and Reyna
that best corresponds to their shared gist of the case. Therefore, characterizing jurors
according to their gist interpretations of a case will allow researchers to separate effects of
mental representations of a case from difficulties in constructing appropriate numbers.
Finally, juries composed of medium and low gist members (or medium and high gist
members) will be unduly influenced by low or high gist members, respectively, even when
they are fewer in number than medium jurors. Jurors who view damages as “medium” are
less likely to influence the debate because they lack a clear, bottom-line interpretation of
the case; research has shown that intermediate categories such as “medium” are used as
hedges for unsure decisionmakers.46
Overall, this approach emphasizes the juror deliberation process as a search for a
construal of the case that captures its essential bottom line. The approach also suggests that
particular constellations of jurors with different construals or gist representations will
interact in predictable ways, debating either the gist or the numbers, with disproportionate
influence favoring jurors with low or high interpretations rather than wishy-washy
“medium” jurors. Of course, jurors might also make compromises to reach a decision,
adjusting awards to accommodate other views.
This framework implies that number construction—the process of selecting numbers
to convey the gist of an injury—has its own complexities, distinct from construing the gist
of the injury. An interesting question is whether people have a sense of what constitute
“low” and “high” numbers (in our context, dollar awards) before confronting the particular
situation or case at hand. Extensive work on numeracy has considered people’s general
ability to understand and use numbers.47 However, much of that work has emphasized rote
computation.
We think that a better way to consider numeracy, especially as it is applied in the jury
damage award setting, is as a contextual ability rather than a general one. Consider the
statement that 1,000 bees have been counted in Ithaca, New York. If one is not an expert
on bee populations in a town of this size and in this geographic location, it is difficult to
know whether 1,000 bees is a large and newsworthy number or whether it represents a
declining bee colony and thus cause for concern. The juror deciding on damages is often
in a similar position, not knowing whether dollar amounts are appropriately low or high.
However, if the decisionmaker has experience in the relevant context—for example,
a juror who works in the insurance industry, a lawyer with similarly injured clients, or a
judge who presides over multiple personal injury cases—the decisionmaker might well have
a numerical interpretation of “low” and “high” dollar values that can be marshaled in
considering the present valuation of a plaintiff’s injury. In this view, familiarity with the
context of awards is an asset rather than a source of bias. (Of course, this type of compara-
tive information is withheld from jurors deciding individual cases.) If such familiarity and
experience are lacking, the decisionmaker will rely on what is provided in case facts or
attorney arguments, or otherwise accessible and culturally available sources, that best
46Reyna & Lloyd, supra note 40.
47Reyna & Brainerd, Numeracy, Ratio Bias, and Denominator Neglect, supra note 18.
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reflect meaning or gist. For example, figures such as a billion dollars are widely perceived
to represent “a lot of” money, whereas awards of one dollar are perceived as “nil.” A year’s
profits, a day’s sales, and other meaningful numbers can be used to provide a framework
for constructing magnitudes of awards. More generally, meaningful numbers would be
expected to be disproportionately influential in the minds of jurors as they attempt to
match the award amounts to gist-based judgments of severity of damages.
A. Similarities and Differences Between Our Model and the Story Model
Our model builds on the story model of juror decision making developed by Nancy
Pennington and Reid Hastie, and makes new predictions.48 Results supporting the story
model’s account of legal decision making, along with similar results from psycholinguistics,
were part of the impetus for fuzzy-trace theory that we draw on in our gist-based model of
damage award judgment. For example, Pennington and Hastie showed that mock jurors
later recognized more case information consistent with their verdict than evidence incon-
sistent with it, and erroneously recognized verdict-consistent story elements that were never
presented, a classic false memory effect.49 Although false-memory results were once taken to
be evidence that memory is wholly reconstructive, many studies have shown that memory
for details of information, verbatim memory, is independent of memory for meaning, or
gist memory. By distinguishing between two kinds of memory, fuzzy-trace theory is able to
predict both the meaning-based findings of the story model and discrepant findings regard-
ing immediate memory for specific items of information.
The story model highlights the central meanings that jurors construct on the basis of
the case facts, character of the parties, and contextual factors. In the gist-based model we
propose, gist constitutes the core or central meaning of a story. The meaning of the story
includes the categorical and ordinal gist, and therefore should influence the magnitude of
the award.50 The meaning of the story that the juror constructs may imply that a specific
dollar value is highly significant—perhaps, for example, the dollar amount that the defen-
dant gained as a result of the action that injured the plaintiff. Giving meaning to numbers
is likely to encourage acceptance of such numbers when they resonate with the story the
juror has constructed.
48Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 Cardozo L.
Rev. 519 (1991); Reid Hastie, What’s the Story? Explanations and Narratives in Civil Jury Decisions, in Civil Juries and
Civil Justice 23 (Brian H. Bornstein, Richard L. Wiener, Robert Schopp & Steven L. Willborn eds., 2008).
49Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making: Effects of Memory Structure on Judgment,
14 J. Experimental Psychol.: Learning, Memory & Cognition 521 (1988). False memories were assumed to reflect
reconstruction based on meaning (sometimes called “schematic memory”). See also Nancy Pennington & Reid
Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol.
189 (1992). Although recent approaches to judgment and decision making stress Cartesian dual processes of
rationality versus emotion, the dual processes of verbatim and gist processing resemble those of gestalt psychology,
similarly distinguishing reasoning by rote and reasoning based on understanding. See Charles J. Brainerd & Valerie
F. Reyna, The Science of False Memory (2005).
50Valerie F. Reyna & Barbara Kiernan, The Development of Gist Versus Verbatim Memory in Sentence Recognition:
Effects of Lexical Familiarity, Semantic Content, Encoding Instruction, and Retention Interval, 30 Developmental
Psychol. 178 (1994).
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However, it is important to distinguish what the gist-based model includes that is not
included in the story model. The story model does not differentiate between gist and
verbatim representations, even though the memory literature provides ample evidence that
people distinguish between gist and verbatim representations and tend to rely more on gist
than on verbatim representations in decision making.51 In addition, the story model does
not assume that categorical and ordinal representations are constructed as a result of
integrating the information about a case, only that jurors in later stages will develop
representations of the verdict alternatives.
V. Assessing the Validity of the Gist-Based Model with
Jury Award Data
Our model hypothesizes that jurors make categorical and ordinal gist determinations, and
then search for dollar award amounts that fit the gist judgments. Although key components
of the general gist-based model have been tested in memory and decision-making research,
carefully controlled experiments are needed to test the applicability of the model for jury
damage award decision making. A test might measure participants’ gist representations
across a number of cases, as well as their gist of corresponding numbers in context (what
corresponds to low, medium, and high dollar values in particular contexts). Both these
measures should predict actual award determinations. Because jurors are assumed to have
ordinal-level representations, we predict that awards will be ordinally coherent, but abso-
lute award amounts should vary across contexts because what is perceived as low or high is
inherently relative.
Although we have not yet done those studies, so we do not have a definitive test of our
model, in this section we draw on research studies of jury awards to assess whether the
observed patterns in these data are consistent with the model and its predictions. We do so
mindful of Hastie’s point that once one moves into the messy environment of real-world
decision making, it can be challenging to assess the psychological underpinnings of
observed phenomena.52
The model makes several specific predictions. First, jurors will search for meaningful
numbers to give effect to their gist judgments. In addition, we should see patterning and
scalloping around round numbers, which are easier to map onto gist judgments. Second,
because of the ordinal nature of jurors’ injury judgments and the damage awards that
differently-injured plaintiffs deserve, we expect to observe ordinal regularities in jury
awards. Third, even though ordinal regularities in jury awards should be present, judges’
awards for similar injuries across cases should be less variable than juries’ awards for simi-
lar injuries across cases. Judges as expert decisionmakers are more apt to make simple
51Brainerd & Reyna, supra note 49; Herbert H. Clark & Eve V. Clark, Psychology and Language: An Introduction to
Psycholinguistics (1977); David A. Gallo, Associative Illusions of Memory (2006); Walter Kintsch, The Representation
of Meaning in Memory (1974).
52Reid Hastie, The Challenge to Produce Useful “Legal Numbers,” J. Empirical Legal Stud. (this issue).
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gist-based judgments, and to take advantage of comparative information about other
similar cases, information that is withheld from juries. Finally, because gist is relative, and
dollar amounts are interpreted relative to other quantities to give them meaning, anchor
figures will influence jury awards. Anchors for juries’ total damage awards might include
economic damages, attorneys’ ad damnum requests, and caps on damage awards. All four
of these predictions find some support in the research on jury damage awards.
A. Meaningful Numbers and Round Numbers
The gist model predicts that jurors search for numbers that are meaningful to them and
reflect the case’s gist. Therefore, we are likely to observe patterns in the specific dollar
figures of damage awards. Gist is easier to map onto round numbers because round
numbers are not exact. Therefore, we expect to see numbers that are rounded off, particu-
larly for noneconomic and punitive damages.53 Of course, any particular round number
could be a precise number. However, if numbers are processed as continuous quantities
rather than as categories, there should be no discontinuities or bumps in their perceived
magnitudes.54 Instead, our model predicts that we should observe “scalloping” or “bumps”
(i.e., certain numbers observed more frequently than adjacent numbers) at round
numbers, and at numbers that signal category boundaries. These category boundaries
might include distinctions between zero and any quantity, between certainty and uncer-
tainty, and similar qualitative shifts.
New work shows that people have strong preferences for round numbers, consistent
with the gist model. For example, a recent analysis of a large-scale digital scan of books
showed a strong pattern in number frequency, which revealed an “extraordinary human
fondness for round numbers. . . . Dollar amounts are even more dramatically biased in
favor of well-rounded numbers.”55
Data from the 2005 Civil Justice Survey of State Courts allow us to explore the extent
to which national data about jury damage awards are consistent with predictions derived
from the gist-based model we propose. The Civil Justice Survey is a joint project of the
National Center for State Courts and the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The project sampled
state courts of general jurisdiction in selected U.S. counties, and recorded information
about tort, contract, and property cases decided in these courts during the calendar year
2005, including award information.56 The data set permits us to examine the relative
53Lacetera et al., supra note 21, at 1 (analyzing over 22 million wholesale used-car transactions, and finding “substan-
tial evidence of . . . left-digit bias; there are large and discontinuous drops in sale prices at 10,000-mile thresholds in
odometer mileage, along with smaller drops at 1,000-mile thresholds”).
54Numbers are processed as both verbatim, continuous quantities and as fuzzy gist categories simultaneously, accord-
ing to fuzzy-trace theory. Reyna & Brainerd, Numeracy, Ratio Bias, and Denominator Neglect, supra note 18.
55Brian Hayes, Bit Lit, 99 Am. Sci. 190, 193 (2011) (showing relatively high frequency of round numbers in material
scanned by Google Books).
56U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2005 (Study No. 23862, 2005) [hereinafter Civil Justice
Survey of State Courts, 2005]; Lynn Langton & Thomas H. Cohen, Civil Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005
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frequency of round-number damage awards, as well as the relationship between different
components of jury damages.
Figure 2 confirms the expectation, based on the cited work documenting round-
number preferences, that jury awards are highly likely to end in round numbers. Analyzing
the pattern of awards in the 2005 Civil Justice Survey, we find that a substantial proportion
of damage awards end in zero.
Figure 2 shows some intriguing differences across damage award types. The first set
of columns shows the general category of compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff
in judge trials and jury trials. The compensatory damage award variable includes awards of
two types. Some states require only a general compensatory damage award figure that
combines compensation for both economic and noneconomic damages. In other states, the
award is given in separate amounts for economic damages and noneconomic damages.
Coders summed these two amounts to arrive at an overall compensatory damage award for
those cases. Both types of award, then, are included in the compensatory damages columns.
(Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report 2009), available at <http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cbjtsc05.pdf> (describing major results of Civil Justice Survey). The analyses are conducted with unweighted cases
with overall plaintiff winners and nonzero positive dollar awards. Analyses employed the initial awards reached by the
trial judge or the jury before any adjustments were made to reflect the plaintiff’s fault, awards to the defendant on
cross-claims, caps, agreement between the parties, or other reasons.
Figure 2: Proportion of damage awards ending in zero, by decisionmaker and damage
award type.
Note: Analyses are based on unweighted cases with overall plaintiff winners and nonzero positive awards. The initial
awards before any adjustments are made are employed in the analyses. Number of cases included in the analyses:
4,452 for compensatory damages (which includes both economic and noneconomic damages); 3,745 for economic
damages alone; 1,154 for noneconomic damages alone; and 188 for punitive damages. Awards were rounded to the
nearest dollar by the original coders. Data from U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2005
(Study No. 23862, 2005).
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Overall, a little over half the compensatory damage awards end in zero. When we consider
the subset of cases in which it is possible to view separately the economic and noneconomic
components, we observe that noneconomic awards are substantially more apt to end in zero
(90 percent) than awards for economic damages (52 percent). Like noneconomic awards,
punitive damage awards are also highly likely to end in zero (84 percent overall).
Juries are more likely than judges to give awards that end in zero. The differences
between judges and juries in the likelihood of awards ending in zero are statistically
significant for both general compensatory awards and economic damage awards.57 Juries
are slightly more apt than judges to arrive at awards that end in zero in the other two
damage award categories, but the differences do not reach traditional levels of statistical
significance.
Another factor in the likelihood of zero-ending awards is the award size. In compen-
satory and economic damage awards, the proportion of round-number awards increases as
the amount of the award goes up.58 See Figure 3. For compensatory damage awards, the
round-number awards are comparable in frequency until the awards reach 1 million dollars
or more, when they jump significantly. For economic damage awards, the round-number
57For compensatory damages, c2 (1 df ) = 84.93, p = 0.000; for economic damages, c2 (1 df ) = 43.73, p < 0.001.
58For compensatory damages, c2 (3 df ) = 12.90, p = 0.005; for economic damages, c2 (3 df ) = 8.2, p = 0.04.
Figure 3: Proportion of damage awards ending in zero, by type and amount of damages.
Note: Analyses are based on unweighted cases with overall plaintiff winners and nonzero positive awards. The initial
awards before any adjustments are made are employed in the analyses. Number of cases included in the analyses:
4,452 for compensatory damages (which includes both economic and noneconomic damages); 3,745 for economic
damages alone; 1,154 for noneconomic damages alone; and 188 for punitive damages. Awards were rounded to the
nearest dollar by the original coders. Data from U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2005
(Study No. 23862, 2005).
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awards show a stair-step linear trend as the category amount increases in value. Figure 3
shows that in both the other award categories, there is a visible increase in the highest award
amount category (1 million dollars or more), but in neither case does the increase achieve
statistical significance.
These patterns are compatible with the gist model, and its expectation that jurors will
map gist onto round numbers. The finding that judges, too, show a strong preference for
round numbers is intriguing but consistent with the idea that expert decisionmakers often
rely on gist determinations in their judgments. Of course, the tendency to adopt round-
number figures could also be driven by attorney requests, expert testimony about predicted
damages, or other dollar amounts mentioned during the trial that were round rather than
precise numbers. It is quite likely that lawyers and experts share the factfinders’ preference
for round numbers. Interestingly, recent research shows that precise numbers are consid-
ered to be lower than comparable round numbers.59 That suggests that there could be
strategic advantages for attorneys who ask the jury to consider precise rather than round-
number damage awards.60
B. Other Meaningful Numbers
In addition to the pattern we have documented with round numbers, we would also
expect to see overrepresentation of what jurors perceive as significant and meaningful
sums (e.g., $10,000, or $50,000, or $1 million). Jury deliberations about damages should
routinely invoke the meaning behind particular numbers. It should be possible to inves-
tigate whether there is consensus within communities about the meaning of particular
amounts of money in target contexts (i.e., whether $100,000 is considered a large amount
of money in the context of permanent disability, intentional pollution, etc.). Depending
on the context, a particular amount could convey low or high gist. For example, a per-
son’s age, wealth, and earning capacity all may figure into whether a particular amount
is perceived as low or high.
We have located several case examples that jurors search out meaningful numbers,
and offer a few illustrations here, starting with one dollar awards and ending at the high end
with a $5 billion award.
C. One Dollar Awards
First is the rare but not unheard of situation of one dollar awards. In the 2005 Civil Justice
Survey, there are a handful of damage awards of one dollar out of thousands of trials.61
Figure 4 shows that there are two cases in which there was a moderate economic damage
59Manoj Thomas & Vicki Morwitz, Heuristics in Numerical Cognition: Implications for Pricing, in Handbook of
Pricing Research in Marketing 132 (Vithala Rau ed., 2009); Thomas et al., The Price Precision Effect, supra note 25.
60For a direct application of the price precision effect to damage award requests, see David Davis, Some Juror Rules
for Determining Damages, 20 Jury Expert 24 (2008).
61Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2005, supra note 56.
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award but the jury awarded just one dollar in noneconomic damages to the plaintiff.
Looking ahead, one can identify these two cases in Figure 4, presented in a later section of
this article; they are the two outlier cases at the log10 value of 0 for the noneconomic award.
Likewise, Figure 5 shows a modestly-sized compensatory damage award by a jury that was
accompanied by a one dollar punitive damage award. In anyone’s book, a one dollar award
is “low.” Although some of the one dollar awards might be attributable to a token payment
or a convention that does not reflect the jury’s evaluation of the minimal worth of the case,
at least some appear to be driven by the jury’s gist of the injury’s value.
The gist behind the choice of a one dollar award is nicely illustrated by the case
of Ward Churchill, a controversial University of Colorado professor of ethnic studies,
who created a firestorm of protest when he called victims of the September 11 attack
“little Eichmanns,” after the notorious Nazi war criminal.62 He was subsequently fired on
grounds of research misconduct, but he sued the university, claiming that they fired
him not because of that misconduct but because of his September 11 remarks, which
he argued were protected on academic freedom grounds. The Colorado jury found
for Churchill, but awarded him just $1 in damages. The president of the University of
Colorado said that the jury’s nominal award was “an indication of what they thought of
the value of Ward Churchill’s claim.”63
In Hans’s interview study with civil jurors, they regularly faced—with some
perplexity—the challenge of awarding monetary compensation to a plaintiff’s spouse for
loss of consortium.64 Although some jurors did not grant legitimacy to the idea of compen-
sating a spouse on these grounds, they expressed concern that they avoid insulting the
spouse. Often, $5,000 did the trick.65 As the authors write: “about half of the loss of
consortium awards in our study cases were exactly $5,000. We wondered why so many juries
independently had come up with this particular figure. . . . Unless jurors were strongly
hostile toward those seeking loss of consortium, they were reluctant to return a zero award.
To the jurors this zero award represented an insult or a slap in the face to the spouses, who
often had to testify about revealing aspects of their personal lives in public. . . . Juries
appeared to be awarding symbolic small amounts to avoid offending plaintiffs.”66
62See discussion in Ivan Moreno, Jury: Churchill Wrongfully Terminated, Awarded $1, cbs4denver.com, Apr. 2, 2009
<http://cbs4denver.com/local/verdict.churchill.colorado.2.974641.html>. See also Peter Schmidt, Churchill Wins
Lawsuit, But Only $1 in Damages, Chron. of Higher Educ., Apr. 3, 2009 <http://chronicle.com/article/Chruchill-
Wins-Lawsuit-but/47157>; Peter Schmidt, Ward Churchill’s $1 Damage Award Said to Have Been Product of
Jury Compromise, Chron. of Higher Educ., Apr. 3, 2009 <http://chronicle.com/article/Ward-Chruchill-s-1-
Damage/42681>.
63Schmidt, Churchill Wins Lawsuit, But Only $1 in Damages, supra note 62.
64Valerie P. Hans & Michelle Hallerdin, Juror Skepticism Toward Plaintiffs: The Example of Loss of Consortium
Claims. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, San Diego, CA (Mar. 13, 1992).
65Id. at 8.
66Id.
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D. Meaning in Extremely Large Awards
We believe that the gist model helps explain the specific dollar amounts in some extremely
large jury awards, amounts that very often seem inexplicable and irrational to outside
observers.67 In the well-known McDonald’s coffee-spill case, the plaintiff’s attorney in the
case argued to the jury that it might want to punish McDonald’s for one or two days’ worth
of coffee sales. He estimated that that amounted to about $1.35 million per day. The jury
concluded that an appropriate punishment was two days’ worth of sales, hence the punitive
damages award of $2.7 million.68
Also consider the $5 billion punitive damage award against the Exxon Corporation in
connection with the massive oil spill from the Exxon Valdez; the accident occurred when the
captain was drunk and was away from the bridge.69 An in-depth journalistic account,
including material based on interviews with the jurors, who described their deliberations
over punitive damages, provides support that the $5 billion figure for typical yearly world-
wide profits for Exxon influenced the choice of punitive damage award.70 The plaintiff’s
attorney O’Neill argued to the jury that Exxon should pay punitive damages of somewhere
between $5 and $20 billion. He also displayed a chart with Exxon’s revenues, net income,
and net worth. Jurors deliberated, but could not agree on a figure. “After about 50 votes, the
jury was closing in on the $5 billion figure. . . . [the majority] agreed to $5 billion. That left
Wilson, Dean and Provost. Wilson was the next to agree. . . . But Dean and Provost
remained fixated on $3.51 billion, Exxon’s profits the year of the spill. Eventually, Dean
decided that $5 billion was ‘the happy medium’ and he joined the crowd. That left Provost.
Driving home that night, Provost said she started thinking. Exxon’s profits were $3.51
billion the year of the spill, but typically the company posted $5 billion in profits. Had the
company not spent a couple billion cleaning up the spill, profits for 1989 would have been
$5 billion. That was good enough for Provost.” Note that the final awarded amount did not
approach what half the jurors had initially recommended, but settled instead on the highly
symbolic amount of one year’s usual profits.
67Sunstein et al., supra note 14, at 3, write with dismay about the California jury that awarded close to 5 billion dollars,
reportedly based on an estimate of the yearly advertising budget of the negligent company. If it is the case that jurors
relied on the annual advertising budget, we view this as another example of jurors searching in the case for
meaningful numbers that accord with their gist of the magnitude of the deserved damages.
68Andrea Gerlin, How a Jury Decided that a Coffee Spill is Worth $2.9 Million, Wall St. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at A1; Hans,
Business on Trial, supra note 3, at 70–72.
69In re the Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1238–39 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit’s opinion concludes that the
jury may have considered yearly Exxon profits as a meaningful benchmark: “This was a very bad oil spill. Captain
Hazelwood’s conduct, interpreting the evidence most strongly against him, was extremely reckless considering
the difficulty and potential risk of his task, and Exxon was reckless to allow him to perform this task despite its
knowledge that he was drinking again. The punitive damages amount, $5 billion, is about one year’s net profits
for the entire world-wide operations of Exxon, and the jury may well have decided that for such egregious conduct
the company responsible ought to have a year without profit.”
70Natalie Phillips & Staff, The $5 Million Jury: For 18 Weeks, the Exxon Valdez Trial Jurors Listened, Argued, Laughed
and Sometimes Even Dozed Off, Anchorage Daily News (AK), Jan. 22, 1995.
Qualitative to Quantitative Translation in Jury Damage Awards 139
E. Ordinal Regularities in Jury Damage Awards
To the extent that there is societal consensus about relative harms, and overlap in what
people consider to be low, medium, and high amounts of money, we predict ordinal
regularities in the awards reached by juries. That is, even though they decide different cases
at different times, juries will compensate those who have minor injuries less than those who
have major injuries. As described earlier, evidence confirms these ordinal regularities in
actual jury awards.71 To provide a few additional examples, consistent with the idea that
ordinal gist judgments characterize juror evaluations and juror damage award preferences,
the research by Sunstein and colleagues on punitive damages found that “judgments of
punitive intent and of dollar awards share the same core of moral outrage, and therefore
produce the same ordering of cases.”72 In another judgment domain, Hastie cites work on
consumer pricing that reveals that once consumers are anchored on a figure, they are
“meticulous in maintaining a single coherent ordering on prices across products.”73 Eisenberg,
Hans, and Wells combined award data from three different civil trial data sets, one that
included a broad range of awards, and two others that focused specifically on high damage
award cases. Analyzing the logged dollar values of punitive and compensatory awards from
these three data sets combined, they found a predominantly linear relationship, supporting
our expectation of an ordinal pattern.74 Similarly, Eisenberg and Heise analyzed the
punitive-compensatory relationship in four Civil Justice Survey data sets and confirmed the
positive association between the two types of awards.75
Data from the 2005 Civil Justice Survey of State Courts allow us to take a fresh look at
the question of the relationship between the dollar values of noneconomic and economic
damage awards reached by juries and, by way of contrast, the awards of judges as well.76
Analyzing the relationship between economic and noneconomic damage awards in the
Civil Justice Survey data set, we expect to find, for both judges and juries, an ordinal
relationship whereby the larger the economic damages, the larger the noneconomic
damages. The relationship may be stronger for judges than for juries, if they place greater
weight on the plaintiff’s economic harm than juries do. Alternatively, if judges use
71Eisenberg et al., Real-WorldCoherence, supranote 28; Eisenberg,Hans&Wells, supranote 29;CatherineM. Sharkey,
Dissecting Damages: An Empirical Exploration of Sexual Harassment Awards, 3 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 1 (2006).
72David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 Colum.
L. Rev. 1139, 1152 (2000); see also Sunstein et al., supra note 14, at 48–49.
73Hastie, supra note 52, at 12.
74Eisenberg, Hans & Wells, supra note 29. See also Theodore Eisenberg, Michael Heise, Nicole L. Waters & Martin T.
Wells, The Decision to Award Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 2 J. Legal Analysis 577, 608 (2010) [hereinafter
Eisenberg et al., The Decision to Award Punitive Damages] (examining the relationship between compensatory and
punitive damages in the 2005 data).
75Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Judge-Jury Difference in Punitive Damages Awards: Who Listens to the
Supreme Court? 2 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 325, 343 (2011).
76Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2005, supra note 56.
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information outside the individual case to arrive at noneconomic damage amounts, the
relationship may be weaker.
Figure 4 displays the relationship between the logged economic and noneconomic
damages for cases with overall plaintiff winners and nonzero positive dollar values on each
type of damage award. Jury awards are represented by open circles; awards given by judges
in bench trials are represented by stars.
In both judge and jury trials, the economic damage award reached by the decision-
maker is a significant predictor of the noneconomic damage award. Furthermore, one can
observe predominantly linear relationships between the two types of awards, such that the
larger the economic damage award decided by the judge or the jury, the larger the
noneconomic damage award. The slope appears steeper for jury awards than for judge
awards, although the interaction term between the economic damage award and the
decisionmaker is only marginally significant (p < 0.09). That suggests that the amount of
Figure 4: The relationship between economic and noneconomic damage awards in bench
and jury trials.
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economic damage that a plaintiff experiences in a case serves as a slightly stronger deter-
minant of the noneconomic damage award for juries as compared to judges.
Figure 5 shows a similar analysis of awards from the 2005 Civil Justice Survey, but this
time for the relationship between the total compensatory awards (which combine both
economic and noneconomic damages) and the punitive damage awards. The analysis is
limited to those cases with overall plaintiff winners and nonzero positive dollar values for
both compensatory and punitive damage awards. As before, jury awards are represented by
open circles; awards given by judges in bench trials are represented by stars.
Again, the relationship between the two types of damage awards is generally similar
for both judge and jury, reflecting a strong ordinal pattern in which low and high com-
pensatory damage cases net low and high punitive damage awards, respectively. The slope
is significantly (p < 0.05) steeper for jury awards than for judge awards. The degree to which
the plaintiff requires compensatory damages in a case is a stronger determinant of a
punitive damage award for juries than for judges. It is worthwhile noting that cases are not
Figure 5: The relationship between compensatory and punitive damage awards in bench
and jury trials.
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randomly assigned to judge and jury trials, and case routing as well as other differences
between judges and juries might account for the slightly different patterns observed.
If we take the underlying compensatory damage awards as revealing the factfinder’s
ordinal rankings of harm done, and we do, then finding ordinal regularities such as the one
observed for the compensatory-punitive damage relationship reinforces the model’s pre-
sumption of the importance of ordinal ranking in jury damage award judgments even in
punitive damages, which are thought to be erratic and inexplicable.77 In sum, our model
predicts, and the available research on jury damage awards generally finds, that there are
coherent ordinal patterns in award determinations.
F. Jury Awards Should Vary More Than Judge Awards
Even though ordinal regularities in jury awards are observed, the model predicts that jury
damage awards will vary more than judge damage awards for the same types of injuries and
cases. The reasons are twofold. Because judges are expert decisionmakers, we can predict
that their judgments will be even more likely to be simple gist-based judgments. But more
importantly, judicial awards will be less variable because their contextual experience offers
them comparative information, and juries do not have this advantage.78 Indeed, it is
possible that judges’ reliance on contextual or comparative information explains the flatter
slopes for judge awards in Figures 4 and 5.
Analysis of damage awards in the 2005 Civil Justice Survey data set by other scholars
confirms the expectation that jury awards in the aggregate are more variable than judge
awards in the aggregate, consistent with the model’s expectations.79 Greater variability in
jury awards compared to judge awards in actual jury and judge decisions, of course, is not
necessarily dispositive evidence for the model. Future research must independently assess
the value of cases because different, and higher dollar value, cases are typically routed to
juries.80 Thus, it is important to develop methods to tease apart, and adjust for, case
differences in order to study decisionmaker differences.
G. Anchors Should Affect Jury Decision Making
Our model anticipates that anchors will influence jury damage award assessments. A
number of psychological mechanisms are thought to produce anchoring, including con-
firmatory hypothesis testing, insufficient adjustment, and numeric priming.81 Fuzzy-trace
77See, for example, Sunstein et al., supra note 14, at 3 (“inexplicable”) and 31 (“erratic”).
78For a discussion of the fact-finding advantages of judges over juries, see Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific
Evidence, 16 J.L. & Pol’y 19 (2007).
79Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 75, at 331(showing, for 2005 data, higher means, medians, and standard deviations
for juries’ compensatory and punitive damage awards, compared to judges’ awards).
80Id. See also Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1919 (2009).
81Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, Anchoring Unbound, 20 J. Consumer Psychol. 20 (2010).
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theory anticipates that anchors will influence award amounts because gist is relative. Dollar
amounts, just like probabilities and other quantities, are interpreted relative to other
quantities to give them meaning. Furthermore, anchors presented during trial should have
a stronger impact on jury assessments than on judge assessments because judges are apt to
have contextual and comparative information about other cases that may counteract or
outweigh the impact of anchors presented during trial.
The research literature on anchoring includes many successful demonstrations of the
anchoring process using arbitrary or nonsense anchors, such as numbers from a roulette
wheel spin or the last four digits of a Social Security or telephone number. Our gist-based
model anticipates that people may be influenced by arbitrary anchors in information-poor
environments. We assume that there is no number in the head that can be discovered
through better measurement; therefore, other numbers, including anchors, provide
needed context to flesh out damage awards that are perceived as low or high. However,
in our model, there is a strong expectation that a meaningful anchor will be more persua-
sive than an arbitrary one, so long as it is consistent with the gist that jurors extract from
the facts.
Evidence presented in a typical civil jury trial functions as a naturally occurring,
and often meaningful, anchor. The amount of economic damage, whether it is provided
quantitatively in dollars or qualitatively in magnitude estimates, serves as one important
guidepost for jurors, as Figure 4 indicates.82 The strong connection between compensatory
and punitive damages shown in Figure 5 is consistent with the possibility that compensatory
damages serve as anchors for decisionmakers as they deliberate on the amount of punitive
damages to award.
One type of anchor produced by attorneys as part of a persuasion effort is the
attorney’s ad damnum or request for a specific damage award figure. Experiments on attorney
requests such as ad damnums show, consistent with our model’s predictions, reliable effects
of plaintiff and defense ad damnums.83 Variation in the way that figures are submitted to the
jury can also change the resulting damage award. For example, McAuliff and Bornstein
varied whether their study participants heard a lump-sum ad damnum or heard a per-diem
amount request for an award to compensate the plaintiff for pain and suffering.84 Attorney
requests for a lump sum of $175,000 and an hourly rate of $10 produced higher damage
82Other studies have also found links among injury severity, economic damages, and pain and suffering awards. See
Randall Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan & James F. Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and
Suffering,” 83 NW U.L. Rev. 908 (1989); Gregory B. Rodgers, Estimating Jury Compensation for Pain and Suffering
in Product Liability Cases Involving Nonfatal Personal Injury, 6 J. Forensic Econ. 251 (1993) (using jury award data
from Jury Verdict Research, Inc., and finding that pain and suffering compensation are related to injury severity and
economic losses); Vidmar & Hans, supra note 28, at 281–302.
83Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose, Beth Murphy & John Meixner, Anchors and Set Asides on Real Juries,
J. Empirical Legal Stud. (this issue); Greene & Bornstein, Determining Damages, supra note 1, at 150–59.
84Bradley D. McAuliff & Brian H. Bornstein, All Anchors Are Not Created Equal: The Effects of Per Diem Versus
Lump Sum Requests on Pain and Suffering Awards, 34 Law & Hum. Behav. 164 (2010).
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awards than $240 per day or $7,300 per month, even though all the per-diem payments
approximated the lump-sum payment.85
Regulations of ad damnums vary across jurisdictions. Some states, for example, do
not permit an attorney to suggest total dollar figures or per-diem amounts to the jury.
Assuming that attorney recommendations are related to the relative severity of their
cases, we predict that if attorney recommendations on damage award totals are allowed,
that will reduce the variance compared to sets of cases without attorney recommenda-
tions, all else equal.86 The effect of ad damnums could be challenging to tease apart in
the real world because attorney requests are linked to the value of their cases. Thus it
would be difficult to determine whether jury judgments in line with ad damnums are
driven by the ad damnums themselves, above and beyond the value of the cases. Fur-
thermore, there could be other differences in the caseloads of jurisdictions that do or do
not allow attorneys to offer ad damnums. It is also possible that attorney recommenda-
tions bear little relationship to the value of their cases, or that plaintiff recommendations
are substantially higher than typical awards, in which case ad damnums might have no
effect or might even exacerbate the unpredictability of jury awards. However, comparing
cases with comparable economic or other independently assessed valuations in jurisdic-
tions with and without ad damnums offers an opportunity to estimate effects of ad
damnum recommendations as anchors.
Caps or absolute limits on damage awards may also operate as anchors, if they become
known to the jury. If a cap becomes known to the jury, it has the effect of changing the
dollar scale from an unbounded to a bounded scale, with a known low and high point. In
theory, this should rationalize jury awards within the jurisdiction. In essence, jurors are
provided with state-sanctioned “low” and “high” values, and the jurors need only map their
own ordinal gist determinations onto the bounded scale, a much simpler cognitive task
than generating one’s own low and high values and then constructing numbers that fit. The
gist model expects that, compared to jurisdictions without caps, caps jurisdictions should
be characterized by stronger relationships between injury severity and the dollar value of
the awards.
Research on the effects of caps shows some influence on damage awards, but with a
paradoxical twist. In experiments testing the impact of award caps, when the dollar amount
of a damages cap becomes known and operates (presumably) as a psychological anchor, it
appears to hoist up what otherwise would have been relatively low awards in no caps
conditions.87 Other work indicates that when noneconomic damages are limited by a cap,
85Id. at 169–70.
86McAuliff & Bornstein, supra note 84, at 170, however, found that the award amount and the variability were both
lower for the control condition in which no ad damnum was requested. In general, as award amounts increase,
variability also increases, making it difficult to test our variability prediction.
87Avraham & Bustos, supra note 9 (undertaking an economic analysis that finds that under a caps regime, although
severely injured plaintiffs will recover less, plaintiffs with low injuries may recover more, compared to similarly injured
plaintiffs in noncaps states).
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economic damages rise.88 This malleability of numerical judgments relative to different
comparative amounts is consistent with predictions of our model and fuzzy-trace theory.
VI. Conclusion
We believe the gist-based model makes a contribution in emphasizing, as other accounts of
jury damage award decision making generally do not, the central importance of the
meaning of numbers. The story model also privileges meaning in its narrative account, but
in a subtly different way. The story model emphasizes the narrative itself, the way facts hang
together in a coherent account. The gist-based approach stresses the narrative too, but goes
further to posit that jurors derive categorical and ordinal judgments from the meaning or
gist of the narrative. It also claims that jurors come to associate particular dollar amounts
with meaning in the context of the trial. Exact numbers have little significance, even to the
highly numerate, until the numbers can be interpreted relative to specific content and
contexts. Thus, anchors have an effect on numerical interpretation, especially when judg-
ments are unfamiliar, as they provide a context in which numbers can be interpreted as low
or high, relative to the anchor.
One advantage of the gist-based model of jury damage awards is that in future work
we should be able to use research on the significance of cues and framing to predict when
verbatim versus gist approaches will dominate juror decision making about damages. In
particular, does requiring jurors to answer interrogatories and reach special verdicts affect
their tendency to employ verbatim rather than gist thinking? The case examples suggest
that attorneys’ arguments for awards can be successful when they propose numbers that
accord with jurors’ gist of the injury. It would be valuable to study this in a controlled
experiment.
The gist-based account is, we think, a more positive take on the jurors’ approach to
damage decisions. The gist that we say drives jurors as they consider damages is not
presumed to be naïve and immature reasoning. Indeed, we observe and can now explain
some regularities and patterns to jury damage awards, whereas before it looked to some
observers as though jurors were erratically grasping at numbers out of thin air.
The impact of anchors is well-documented in the experimental literature. In the
courtroom, there is an abundance of anchoring information in actual cases that reflects the
value of the case. Attorneys provide anchors by offering ad damnums in jurisdictions that
permit them, or by calling fact witnesses and expert witnesses who estimate monetary
losses.89 We have noted above the strong patterns we find with economic damages, non-
economic damages, and punitive damages. The agreement across these types of damages is
generally ordinal, not absolute, as would be predicted by our model.
88Sharkey, Crossing the Punitive-Compensatory Divide, supra note 9.
89Diamond et al., supra note 83.
146 Hans and Reyna
There are also built-in controls and protection against erratic awards. The jury has
the gist. Attorneys and judges have comparative information about similar cases. Attorneys
can (and do) appeal and judges can (and do) review and modify jury awards. Substantial
research shows that the final amounts that defendants pay are a fraction of what is
awarded.90 So, the final jury awards reflect the combined perspectives of juror gist-based
reasoning about a case as well as legal actors’ broad contextual knowledge. Because jurors
are not constrained in their initial categorical and ordinal judgments by comparative
information, this also allows for changes over time in the way the U.S. public evaluates the
meaning and significance of injury to be incorporated into damage awards.91
90David A. Hyman, Bernard Black, Kathryn Zeiler, Charles Silver & William M. Sage, Do Defendants Pay What Juries
Award?: Post-Verdict Haircuts in Texas Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988–2003, 4 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 3 (2007).
Federal law permits judges to reduce (remittitur), but not to increase (additur) jury damage awards. Richard H. Field,
Benjamin Kaplan & Kevin M. Clermont, Civil Procedure: Materials for a Basic Course 9th ed. 1417–27 (2007). States
vary in the extent to which they permit the judge both to increase and decrease jury damage awards. Benjamin V.
Madison, III, Civil Procedure for All States: A Context and Practice Casebook 278–79 (2010).
91Valerie P. Hans, Juries as Conduits for Culture, in Fault Lines: Tort Law and Cultural Practice 80 (D. M. Engel &
M. McCann eds., 2009).
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